Trust Estate
The Moursi Vs Doherty Inheritance Dispute - The "Undue Influence" Test

This article explores a recent court dispute where the issue of "undue influence" - a specific term in law - arose in a case of inheritance and transfer of assets.
It is not every day that these pages contain a discussion of the activities of former cage fighters. It does, however, extensively cover the subject of disputes over wills, inheritance and estate plans. And the following saga, while containing more colour perhaps than is typical, touches on universal requirements such as the need to update wills regularly, communicate estate plans clearly, and seek out independent advice. The following article is by John Melville-Smith, partner at Seddons, the law firm. (Full disclosure: Seddons were instructed by the daughter of Ann Gurney Doherty.) The editors are pleased to share this article with readers. As is always the case, this publication does not necessarily agree with all views of guest contributors and readers who want to respond can email tom.burroughes@wealthbriefing.com
William Paul Doherty, a 33-year old former cage fighter and
convicted fraudster with a professional career that involves
separating elderly ladies with dementia from their property and
money, knocked on the door of 77-year old Ann Gurney around the
end of 2010. He did some minor garden and drainage works for her.
It remains unknown how much she ‘paid’ for this.
A little over a year later, she had ‘sold’ Doherty her £280,000
house ($364,255) for £70,000, ‘given’ him jewellery worth at
least £60,000 and, by the end of 2013, her cash savings had
fallen from around £150,000 - including the purchase monies – to
practically nil. Property and cash totalling some £500,000 had
gone. Mrs Gurney had recently died and her property, registered
in Doherty’s name, was now on the market for £425,000. Such were
the known facts when her daughter, Mrs Moursi, consulted me
towards the end of 2017.
What could be done? There is no law against selling your property
at an undervalue or giving expensive gifts and large quantities
of cash to visiting workmen. Challenges on the basis that the
‘victim’ lacked the necessary mental capacity face a high bar and
initial indications, supported by medical evidence, were that Mrs
Gurney probably did have the necessary level of understanding in
2012.
But a superficial understanding is not always enough and the law
provides a secondary basis for challenge, known as undue
influence.
Actual undue influence comprises overt acts of improper pressure
or coercion such as unlawful threats, of which there was no
evidence.
Presumed undue influence arises out of a relationship between two
persons where one has acquired a measure of influence, or trust
and confidence, of which he then takes unfair advantage by
abusing the influence or trust he has acquired in his own
interests. Mrs Gurney was old, in the early stages of
Alzheimer’s, widowed and had recently lost one of her children to
cancer. She was vulnerable to someone seemingly offering her
companionship and attention. Doherty had quickly become the
central focus of her life: she telephoned him several times every
day, believed they were in love and that he intended to marry
her, gave him a Rolex watch worth well over £50,000 and trusted
him completely with everything.
Whether a transaction was brought about by the exercise of undue
influence is a question for the court to determine on the
evidence. A key factor it will consider is the extent to which a
transaction cannot readily be accounted for by the usual motives
of ordinary persons in that relationship. People like Mrs Gurney
do not typically sell their houses for a fraction of their value
to doorstep odd-job men who have knocked on their door. The
transaction was one which called for an explanation – words that
go to the heart of the law in this field.
To quote directly from Lord Nicholls in the leading case of Royal
Bank of Scotland v Etridge: “Proof that the complainant placed
trust and confidence in the other party in relation to the
management of the complainant's financial affairs, coupled with a
transaction which calls for explanation, will normally be
sufficient, failing satisfactory evidence to the contrary, to
discharge the burden of proof. On proof of these two matters the
stage is set for the court to infer that, in the absence of a
satisfactory explanation, the transaction can only have been
procured by undue influence. In other words, proof of these two
facts is prima facie evidence that the defendant abused the
influence he acquired in the parties' relationship. He preferred
his own interests. He did not behave fairly to the other. So the
evidential burden then shifts to him. It is for him to produce
evidence to counter the inference which otherwise should be
drawn.”
Could Doherty produce the evidence necessary to explain the
transaction?
The most common, and obvious, way of establishing this would have
been to prove that Mrs Gurney had independent legal advice.
Unfortunately for him, the solicitors who acted for Mrs Gurney in
the sale acted also for him in the purchase (in flagrant breach
of professional rules) and they provided no advice to her at all,
specifically failing to advise her that the transaction was
hugely disadvantageous to her.
Further investigations established that the £70,000 purchase
monies were derived from the settlement of previous litigation
and the sale proceeds of its subject property, formerly owned by
one Miss Wilkinson, a 57-year old with early onset dementia, who
had ‘sold’ her £375,000 property to Doherty for £49,000.
Moreover, there was no evidence that any sums in excess of
£12,000 had even been paid: Doherty’s claim was that £20,000 was
paid to Miss Wilkinson in cash, and £17,000 was paid in kind
through work he carried out on the property, as to both of which
there was no evidence. ‘Coincidentally’, Miss Wilkinson had
herself ‘applied’ for a £17,000 home improvement loan, which
disappeared from her account, destination unknown, as soon as it
was credited to it by the lender.
On an application for summary judgment, the High Court set aside
the house sale transaction. Of itself this is unusual –
applications for summary judgement shortcut the usual court
processes and depend upon demonstrating that the other side has
no reasonable prospect of success. Courts are very reluctant to
give summary judgment, therefore, in fact-heavy cases where those
facts are disputed. As Master Price said in this case: “It is not
possible for the court to make findings of fact on contested
evidence on an application for summary judgment, unless the facts
are common ground or incontrovertible, by evidence which
establishes them, or by reason of inherent incredibility.
In this context, an onus is placed on the defendant insofar as he
must, in the language of the old procedure, condescend upon
particulars in his evidence in order to show a case which has a
real prospect of success at trial.
The test is more easily applied in a case in which it is apparent
that disclosure and cross-examination will clearly be irrelevant,
and the court must not, in a case in which those elements have a
role to play, anticipate what might happen as a matter of
probabilities. The question is not whether the defence is
improbable, but whether it lacks any sense of reality or
plausibility.”
Doherty had no realistic prospect of success at trial and
therefore it was appropriate to undo the transaction now and
restore the house to the ownership of Mrs Gurney’s estate.